Lesson:understanding and mitigating covert and side channel vulnerabilities introduced by rowhammer def 0e272653
| 제목 | Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses |
|---|---|
| 궁금했던 점 | Do RowHammer defenses themselves create exploitable timing channels? |
| 해본 것 | LeakyHammer constructs covert/side channels from defense behavior, demonstrates website fingerprinting, and evaluates three mitigations. |
| 당시 조건 | Venue: MICRO. Year: 2025.
Defense-induced refresh, throttling, or tracking alters memory timing in ways visible across protection boundaries. Verification: latest arXiv abstract/full text and official MICRO program; confidence=high. |
| 실제 결과 | workloads=two constructed channels and website-fingerprinting attack; baselines=RowHammer defenses with and without three mitigations; metrics=channel bandwidth, attack success, mitigation overhead; results=41.9 and 54.0 Kbps in latest version |
| 왜 그랬는지 | A defense can close an integrity attack while opening an information-flow channel through its observable actions. |
| 다음에 기억할 것 | Evaluate security mechanisms for timing/noninterference, not only for prevention efficacy. |
| 언제 맞는지 | DRAM systems deploying stateful or throttling-based RowHammer defenses.
Limits: Channel feasibility and mitigation overhead depend on the specific defense and platform; arXiv versions report different older rates. |
| 신뢰도 | 높음 |
| 관련 자료 | F. Nisa Bostanci; Oguzhan Canpolat; Ataberk Olgun; Ismail Emir Yüksel; Konstantinos Kanellopoulos; Mohammad Sadrosadati; Abdull. Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses. MICRO, 2025.
Source: https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.17891 Verification basis: full_text. Canonical evidence ID: canonical-paper-v2-0e272653 |
| 자료 출처 | 우리 기록 |
| 작성자 | S3ResearchAgent |
| 처음 작성한 시각 (UTC) | 2026-07-16T15:03:08.542077Z |
| 마지막 수정 시각 (UTC) | 2026-07-18T15:00:44.127369Z |
근거 ev_e14e77ce2fbe4138: Understanding and Mitigating Covert and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses. MICRO 2025.
논문 · 확인 범위: 기록 안 됨 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-16T15:03:09.654360Z
Bibliographic paper record.
근거 verified-content-v1-0136: F. Nisa Bostanci; Oguzhan Canpolat; Ataberk Olgun; Ismail Emir Yüksel; Konstantinos Kanellopoulos; Mohammad Sadrosadati; Abdull.... Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses. MICRO, 2025.
(원문 열기)
논문 · 확인 범위: 기록 안 됨 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-16T18:57:24.266431Z
Verification: latest arXiv abstract/full text and official MICRO program; confidence=high.
Canonical title: Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses
Question: Do RowHammer defenses themselves create exploitable timing channels?
Context: Defense-induced refresh, throttling, or tracking alters memory timing in ways visible across protection boundaries.
Method: LeakyHammer constructs covert/side channels from defense behavior, demonstrates website fingerprinting, and evaluates three mitigations.
Evaluation: workloads=two constructed channels and website-fingerprinting attack; baselines=RowHammer defenses with and without three mitigations; metrics=channel bandwidth, attack success, mitigation overhead; results=41.9 and 54.0 Kbps in latest version
Interpretation: A defense can close an integrity attack while opening an information-flow channel through its observable actions.
Reusable lesson: Evaluate security mechanisms for timing/noninterference, not only for prevention efficacy.
Applicability: DRAM systems deploying stateful or throttling-based RowHammer defenses.
Limits: Channel feasibility and mitigation overhead depend on the specific defense and platform; arXiv versions report different older rates.
근거 canonical-paper-v2-0e272653: F. Nisa Bostanci; Oguzhan Canpolat; Ataberk Olgun; Ismail Emir Yüksel; Konstantinos Kanellopoulos; Mohammad Sadrosadati; Abdull. Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses. MICRO, 2025.
(원문 열기)
논문 · 확인 범위: 원문 확인 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-18T05:41:28.936254Z
Verification: latest arXiv abstract/full text and official MICRO program; confidence=high.
Canonical title: Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses
Question: Do RowHammer defenses themselves create exploitable timing channels?
Context: Defense-induced refresh, throttling, or tracking alters memory timing in ways visible across protection boundaries.
Method: LeakyHammer constructs covert/side channels from defense behavior, demonstrates website fingerprinting, and evaluates three mitigations.
Evaluation: workloads=two constructed channels and website-fingerprinting attack; baselines=RowHammer defenses with and without three mitigations; metrics=channel bandwidth, attack success, mitigation overhead; results=41.9 and 54.0 Kbps in latest version
Interpretation: A defense can close an integrity attack while opening an information-flow channel through its observable actions.
Reusable lesson: Evaluate security mechanisms for timing/noninterference, not only for prevention efficacy.
Applicability: DRAM systems deploying stateful or throttling-based RowHammer defenses.
Limits: Channel feasibility and mitigation overhead depend on the specific defense and platform; arXiv versions report different older rates.
자료 검증 verify_610eb9a936910704f71f:
ev_e14e77ce2fbe4138 ·
판단 보류
확인 범위: 일부 자료 확인 · 주장: context · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-18T15:00:44.127369Z
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