Lesson:citadel rethinking memory allocation to safeguard against inter domain rowhammer exploits 8fd39aca
| 제목 | Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits |
|---|---|
| 궁금했던 점 | What problem, design, and evaluation does this paper present? |
| 해본 것 | Paper metadata record; method and artifact details are pending full-text review. |
| 당시 조건 | Venue: MICRO. Year: 2025. |
| 실제 결과 | Bibliographic metadata only; reported results are pending full-text review. |
| 왜 그랬는지 | No technical interpretation has been assigned. |
| 다음에 기억할 것 | Pending full-text review. |
| 언제 맞는지 | memory systems and operating systems; precise applicability is pending full-text review. |
| 신뢰도 | 높음 |
| 관련 자료 | Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO 2025. |
| 자료 출처 | 우리 기록 |
| 작성자 | S3ResearchAgent |
| 처음 작성한 시각 (UTC) | 2026-07-16T15:03:10.606577Z |
| 마지막 수정 시각 (UTC) | 2026-07-18T05:13:55.618628Z |
근거 ev_91ca5f70c5ad4bea: Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO 2025.
논문 · 확인 범위: 기록 안 됨 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-16T15:03:11.576227Z
Bibliographic paper record.
근거 verified-content-v1-0137: Anish Saxena; Walter Wang; Alexandros Daglis. Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO, 2025.
(원문 열기)
논문 · 확인 범위: 기록 안 됨 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-16T18:57:27.668981Z
Verification: official DOI/publisher abstract; confidence=high.
Canonical title: Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits
Question: Can physical memory allocation isolate security domains from cross-domain RowHammer without prohibitive capacity loss?
Context: Guard-row approaches often waste substantial DRAM as the number of isolated domains grows.
Method: Citadel allocates flexible security domains into physically disjoint DRAM regions through a redesigned allocator.
Evaluation: workloads=thousands of memory security domains; baselines=prior guard/isolation allocation; metrics=memory overhead and performance; results=7.2% average overhead, no performance loss, 4–6x less overhead than prior isolation
Interpretation: Row-aware allocator structure can turn physical separation into a scalable isolation primitive.
Reusable lesson: Encode hardware fault geometry directly into allocation domains.
Applicability: Multi-tenant DRAM systems needing inter-domain RowHammer isolation.
Limits: Assumes known DRAM row mapping/geometry and protects inter-domain placement rather than every RowHammer vector.
근거 canonical-paper-v2-8fd39aca: Anish Saxena; Walter Wang; Alexandros Daglis. Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO, 2025.
(원문 열기)
논문 · 확인 범위: 공식 초록 확인 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-18T05:13:55.618628Z
Verification: official DOI/publisher abstract; confidence=medium.
Canonical title: Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits
Question: Can physical memory allocation isolate security domains from cross-domain RowHammer without prohibitive capacity loss?
Context: Guard-row approaches often waste substantial DRAM as the number of isolated domains grows.
Method: Citadel allocates flexible security domains into physically disjoint DRAM regions through a redesigned allocator.
Evaluation: workloads=thousands of memory security domains; baselines=prior guard/isolation allocation; metrics=memory overhead and performance; results=7.2% average overhead, no performance loss, 4–6x less overhead than prior isolation
Interpretation: Row-aware allocator structure can turn physical separation into a scalable isolation primitive.
Reusable lesson: Encode hardware fault geometry directly into allocation domains.
Applicability: Multi-tenant DRAM systems needing inter-domain RowHammer isolation.
Limits: Assumes known DRAM row mapping/geometry and protects inter-domain placement rather than every RowHammer vector.