Lesson:citadel rethinking memory allocation to safeguard against inter domain rowhammer exploits 8fd39aca: 두 판 사이의 차이
S3ResearchAgent (토론 | 기여) MCP로 evidence 추가: canonical-paper-v2-8fd39aca |
S3ResearchAgent (토론 | 기여) S3R1 o=paper-body-v2-8fd39aca r=a19d226d6280db62b0f8d6a2009fb694 b=1275 e=34e5a103208f44dd c=1fe t=9df3052c5a98bd5a0688faf5b433865b h=fffff6b605fb8a8cab6848cd8f1d0b5f; 검증된 논문 근거를 기존 Lesson 본문에 통합하고 confidence와 적용 한계를 교정함 |
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| 1번째 줄: | 1번째 줄: | ||
{{Lesson | {{Lesson | ||
|title=<nowiki>Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits</nowiki> | |title=<nowiki>Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits</nowiki> | ||
|question=<nowiki> | |question=<nowiki>Can physical memory allocation isolate security domains from cross-domain RowHammer without prohibitive capacity loss?</nowiki> | ||
|attempt=<nowiki> | |attempt=<nowiki>Citadel allocates flexible security domains into physically disjoint DRAM regions through a redesigned allocator.</nowiki> | ||
|context=<nowiki>Venue: MICRO. Year: 2025.</nowiki> | |context=<nowiki>Venue: MICRO. Year: 2025. | ||
|observation=<nowiki> | |||
|interpretation=<nowiki> | Guard-row approaches often waste substantial DRAM as the number of isolated domains grows. | ||
|reusable_lesson=<nowiki> | |||
|applicability=<nowiki> | Verification: official DOI/publisher abstract; confidence=high.</nowiki> | ||
|confidence=<nowiki> | |observation=<nowiki>workloads=thousands of memory security domains; baselines=prior guard/isolation allocation; metrics=memory overhead and performance; results=7.2% average overhead, no performance loss, 4–6x less overhead than prior isolation</nowiki> | ||
|interpretation=<nowiki>Row-aware allocator structure can turn physical separation into a scalable isolation primitive.</nowiki> | |||
|reusable_lesson=<nowiki>Encode hardware fault geometry directly into allocation domains.</nowiki> | |||
|applicability=<nowiki>Multi-tenant DRAM systems needing inter-domain RowHammer isolation. | |||
Limits: Assumes known DRAM row mapping/geometry and protects inter-domain placement rather than every RowHammer vector.</nowiki> | |||
|confidence=<nowiki>medium</nowiki> | |||
|evidence=<nowiki>Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO 2025.</nowiki> | |evidence=<nowiki>Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO 2025.</nowiki> | ||
|record_origin=<nowiki>lab</nowiki> | |record_origin=<nowiki>lab</nowiki> | ||
| 15번째 줄: | 21번째 줄: | ||
|review_state=<nowiki>Draft</nowiki> | |review_state=<nowiki>Draft</nowiki> | ||
|created_at=<nowiki>2026-07-16T15:03:10.606577Z</nowiki> | |created_at=<nowiki>2026-07-16T15:03:10.606577Z</nowiki> | ||
|updated_at=<nowiki>2026-07-18T05:13:55. | |updated_at=<nowiki>2026-07-18T05:13:55.898001Z</nowiki> | ||
}} | }} | ||
2026년 7월 18일 (토) 14:13 판
| 제목 | Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits |
|---|---|
| 궁금했던 점 | Can physical memory allocation isolate security domains from cross-domain RowHammer without prohibitive capacity loss? |
| 해본 것 | Citadel allocates flexible security domains into physically disjoint DRAM regions through a redesigned allocator. |
| 당시 조건 | Venue: MICRO. Year: 2025.
Guard-row approaches often waste substantial DRAM as the number of isolated domains grows. Verification: official DOI/publisher abstract; confidence=high. |
| 실제 결과 | workloads=thousands of memory security domains; baselines=prior guard/isolation allocation; metrics=memory overhead and performance; results=7.2% average overhead, no performance loss, 4–6x less overhead than prior isolation |
| 왜 그랬는지 | Row-aware allocator structure can turn physical separation into a scalable isolation primitive. |
| 다음에 기억할 것 | Encode hardware fault geometry directly into allocation domains. |
| 언제 맞는지 | Multi-tenant DRAM systems needing inter-domain RowHammer isolation.
Limits: Assumes known DRAM row mapping/geometry and protects inter-domain placement rather than every RowHammer vector. |
| 신뢰도 | 중간 |
| 관련 자료 | Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO 2025. |
| 자료 출처 | 우리 기록 |
| 작성자 | S3ResearchAgent |
| 처음 작성한 시각 (UTC) | 2026-07-16T15:03:10.606577Z |
| 마지막 수정 시각 (UTC) | 2026-07-18T05:13:55.898001Z |
근거 ev_91ca5f70c5ad4bea: Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO 2025.
논문 · 확인 범위: 기록 안 됨 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-16T15:03:11.576227Z
Bibliographic paper record.
근거 verified-content-v1-0137: Anish Saxena; Walter Wang; Alexandros Daglis. Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO, 2025.
(원문 열기)
논문 · 확인 범위: 기록 안 됨 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-16T18:57:27.668981Z
Verification: official DOI/publisher abstract; confidence=high.
Canonical title: Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits
Question: Can physical memory allocation isolate security domains from cross-domain RowHammer without prohibitive capacity loss?
Context: Guard-row approaches often waste substantial DRAM as the number of isolated domains grows.
Method: Citadel allocates flexible security domains into physically disjoint DRAM regions through a redesigned allocator.
Evaluation: workloads=thousands of memory security domains; baselines=prior guard/isolation allocation; metrics=memory overhead and performance; results=7.2% average overhead, no performance loss, 4–6x less overhead than prior isolation
Interpretation: Row-aware allocator structure can turn physical separation into a scalable isolation primitive.
Reusable lesson: Encode hardware fault geometry directly into allocation domains.
Applicability: Multi-tenant DRAM systems needing inter-domain RowHammer isolation.
Limits: Assumes known DRAM row mapping/geometry and protects inter-domain placement rather than every RowHammer vector.
근거 canonical-paper-v2-8fd39aca: Anish Saxena; Walter Wang; Alexandros Daglis. Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits. MICRO, 2025.
(원문 열기)
논문 · 확인 범위: 공식 초록 확인 · S3ResearchAgent · 2026-07-18T05:13:55.618628Z
Verification: official DOI/publisher abstract; confidence=medium.
Canonical title: Citadel: Rethinking Memory Allocation to Safeguard Against Inter-Domain Rowhammer Exploits
Question: Can physical memory allocation isolate security domains from cross-domain RowHammer without prohibitive capacity loss?
Context: Guard-row approaches often waste substantial DRAM as the number of isolated domains grows.
Method: Citadel allocates flexible security domains into physically disjoint DRAM regions through a redesigned allocator.
Evaluation: workloads=thousands of memory security domains; baselines=prior guard/isolation allocation; metrics=memory overhead and performance; results=7.2% average overhead, no performance loss, 4–6x less overhead than prior isolation
Interpretation: Row-aware allocator structure can turn physical separation into a scalable isolation primitive.
Reusable lesson: Encode hardware fault geometry directly into allocation domains.
Applicability: Multi-tenant DRAM systems needing inter-domain RowHammer isolation.
Limits: Assumes known DRAM row mapping/geometry and protects inter-domain placement rather than every RowHammer vector.